how are my product data in the passport protected against misuse

Access rights and technical requirements determine the security

The security of data in the digital product passport results from a combination of access rights and technical requirements that the ESPR imposes on the passport. Not all data in the passport is visible to everyone: the regulation distinguishes between information that is publicly accessible to consumers and other parties, and information that is intended only for specific groups such as competent authorities, economic operators in the supply chain, or repairers. Furthermore, article 11 of the ESPR (Regulation (EU) 2024/1781) sets requirements for the technical design of the passport, including requirements relating to the reliability and origin of the data. Whoever actually hosts the passport and arranges its technical implementation must translate those requirements into concrete measures: authentication, encryption, and restriction of who may access or modify which data.

This concerns data protection, not fraud prevention

The question "how is my product data secured against misuse" has two sides, and the ESPR primarily regulates one of them. The regulation sets requirements for the system: who gets access to which data, how to verify the origin of data, and which technical standards apply to data storage and exchange. That touches on misuse in the sense of unauthorised access or data manipulation. What the ESPR does not regulate is protection against unfair competition that nonetheless gains access to commercially sensitive information because that information must be made publicly available by law — that is a choice made in the delegated regulation per product group, not something that a technical security measure can change. It is therefore important to keep two things separate: which data must be publicly available by law (that follows from the product group-specific rules) and how the data that are not publicly available are shielded (that follows from article 10 and 11 of the ESPR). Anyone concerned about competitors being able to extract precise recipes, supplier names or internal test results from the passport should therefore look at what the product group rules designate as a mandatory field, not at the security of the platform.

No fixed entry date for the technical implementation yet

A precise date on which the technical and organisational security requirements for digital product passports enter into force is not fixed in the core of the ESPR itself. The regulation sets out in article 10 and 11 the framework within which the European Commission, through delegated and implementing acts, will elaborate further per product group how access, authentication and data security are technically designed. Until those implementing acts exist, the general provisions of the ESPR serve as the starting point, but the concrete technical specification — for example which authentication protocol is used or how rights management works precisely — follows per product group at the time that delegated act is adopted. Anyone seeking certainty on this for a specific product group would do well to monitor the status of that delegated regulation through official sources, rather than waiting for a general date that does not exist.

What a manufacturer or importer can take from this

For a manufacturer or importer having a passport compiled, the practical sequence is as follows. First, it is relevant which data the product group-specific rules designate as mandatory public disclosure, and which data may remain with limited accessibility — this determines what exposure there is at all, apart from technical matters. Next, it is relevant how the party hosting the passport technically restricts access to non-public data: with what authentication, and whether a distinction is made between roles such as competent authority, recycler or repairer. Then comes the question of how the identification of the product itself is arranged, since a passport is only as reliable as the link between product and data: see also how you each product receives a unique identification code provide, so that data is not accidentally or deliberately linked to the wrong product. Finally, there is the question of physical access: the QR code on the product itself forms the entry point to the passport, and anyone wondering what happens if that code is damaged or illegible must know that this is a different risk from data breaches — it is then about accessibility, not about misuse of data. For data supplied from your own ERP system, it is also useful to know how that link works, see linking to your own system, because the security of that link is equally part of the chain.

Legal basis: Article 10, 11 and 38 of the ESPR

This explanation follows from three articles of the ESPR (Regulation (EU) 2024/1781). Article 10 describes the requirements for the digital product passport in general terms, including the distinction between public and limited access data. Article 11 governs the technical design and operation of the passport, with requirements concerning the reliability, provenance and security of data, and which parties may access or modify which data. Article 38 sets requirements for actors in the supply chain, which is relevant because multiple parties — manufacturer, importer, distributor — supply or access data, and their role therefore plays a part in how access is regulated.

If you are currently preparing a passport, you would be best advised first to establish which data for your own product group must be publicly disclosed, and to keep that separate from the question of how the hosting party technically secures access to other data — the official texts of Articles 10 and 11 form the starting point for this, supplemented by the product group-specific implementing act as soon as it is available.